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Within two weeks of the Danish cartoon-provoked riots, an Austrian court sentenced the 
“revisionist” historian David Irving, a person well known in European neo-Nazi circles, 
to three years imprisonment under a law that prohibits denial of the Holocaust. It is 
quite inevitable that those two events should be considered together. One forthright 
response is that the suppression of Danish cartoonists and the suppression of Holocaust- 
deniers are both wrong, because freedom of expression is a value that defeats all 
compromise, always. A second possible (but I think unusual -  or not usually avowed) 
response is that free expression is of no significant value to begin with, so that nothing 
important stands in the way of suppressing any objectionable views or images at all, if 
they cause offense. A third response is that one or other of these events -  mocking 
Muhammad, denying the Holocaust -  may rightly attract coercive response, but for 
context-specific reasons. That is the response that I want to discuss here: can one hold a 
background belief in free expression, but also believe that there should be contextually- 
justified exceptions to it? Such a position is very common, and, because of its evident 
moderation, politically tempting. But what amounts to a justifiable exception? Are 
there good reasons for them? Or are sentences that typically begin “I believe in free 
speech, but...” no more than bloodless equivocations?
The starting-point for discussion of freedom of expression in western countries 
is what I shall term -  anachronistically -  “the liberal settlement.” In the early modem 
period, European societies had their fill of religious wars, and eventually came to adopt 
beliefs and practices that secured peace by decoupling religious and political claims 
from one another. As Locke (among many others) argued, if states can legitimately 
impose religion, then churches will be obliged to compete for control of states if they are 
to survive, justifying their claims on the basis of non-negotiable principles that make 
reasoned political coexistence impossible. (“Every church is orthodox to itself,” he 
wrote.) So the solution is that no one’s religion should be imposed, and hence a basic 
condition of citizenship is that each must accept the other’s freedom to practice. This is 
of course to compress a long and complex story and to suppress many qualifications and 
exceptions, as well as to short-circuit the various rival high-level justifications that 
liberal political philosophers have offered for arriving at the goal of toleration. But 
some form of the liberal settlement is the taken-for-granted basis for the belief that
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before political contestation takes place -  before we decide, that is, who is to win and 
who is to lose -  a scheme of protective rights takes some important liberties of 
individuals and groups off the table so that they are not placed at risk. And the freedom 
to express one’s beliefs -  religious or otherwise -  is generally taken to be among the 
most basic of those liberties. A settlement originating in religious pacification comes to 
inform a general view about the boundary between state power and personal entitlement.
In discussions of that view, there are several standard objections to the liberal 
settlement, two of which happen to be precisely relevant to the two recent cases under 
discussion. The first is that even a liberal political order is not only a scheme of general 
rights: it also embodies a particular community with a particular history that leads it to 
hold particular values. That fact may be celebrated, as an indispensable source of 
solidarity; but on the debit side of the solidarity ledger, it must also be noted that 
particular community values may exclude minorities in diffuse or indirect ways that are 
not adequately captured by the idea of rights-violations. The second is that the liberal 
settlement reflects something peculiar to the early-modern European case, that is, a form 
of religious culture that -  however internally divided it may have been -  made possible a 
more painless separation between private and public realms than other religious cultures 
can easily tolerate; for other religious cultures make more of the need for public 
observances. Both of these objections lead to a serious principled case for modifying 
(some) rights as they have been classically understood.
The first objection relates to the Irving case in Austria. To those who hold 
“communitarian” views of political society it is important that societies acknowledge 
their heritage, good and bad, in the course of understanding their identity. In a famous 
essay, Alasdair MacIntyre argued that each of us must learn our place in our national 
narrative, for otherwise, “I will not understand what I owe to others or what others owe 
to me, for what crimes of my nation I am bound to make reparation.”1 On such a view, 
it is morally indispensable that those societies whose history includes participation in 
genocide, for example, should take particular note of that past; it is indispensable not 
only for understanding one’s identity, but also to taking steps to avert the recurrence of 
past atrocity, and to announcing the determination to do so. And on such a view, then, it 
could be right for Austria (but not for every state, for not all states have equivalently 
compromised pasts) to criminalize expression that tends to revive genocidal beliefs. The 
idea of a general right to free expression should then give way to the particularity of 
national community and its moral demands in relation to its past.
When making up for past injustices competes with responding to present 
injustice, the communitarian case is not always very compelling. It is, at least, 
incomplete, for familiar questions arise about priority: don’t the living come first? But 
in the case of issues such as this, where no distributive matters are involved, the 
communitarian claim it is surely at its strongest: the recognition given to wrongs 
suffered by one group does not have to be subtracted, somehow, from what may be due
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to some third party. There are objections, certainly, but they seem to be of a different 
and less abstract order. It is one thing to memorialize, something else to criminalize, and 
legal suppression may simply not be a good idea. There is an important view that legal 
prohibition is a society’s most solemn denunciation of some evil; but nothing in that 
“expressive” view of law, even, shows either that every evil should be suppressed or that 
evils cannot be denounced in alternative ways, sometimes more productively. Whether 
or not criminal law is a productive or counter-productive way of striking at the evil in 
question is a matter for careful and balanced consequentialist reasoning; and the balance 
needs to tip solidly in favour of suppression before the use of law can be justified. So 
while in principle there may be good reasons to modify rights in light of historically- 
based communitarian imperatives, they may not be available in the Irving case. That is 
not because freedom of expression is a sacred cow: it is because the importance of 
coming to terms with history, though weighty, does not motivate the reasonable use of 
criminal law.
The second objection draws upon the fact that while early-modern Catholics 
and Protestants were willing to fight each other to the (cruel) death, they were, 
nevertheless, clearly within the same theological family. The settlement that 
accommodated them successfully may meet with less success outside the family, if it 
reflects some features specific to Christian doctrine. And, one might argue, the 
settlement lends itself well to religious forms that can accept public neutrality if that is 
the price of private freedom. Now one can hardly say that public neutrality is a 
necessary outcome of Christian belief, for, after all, no liberal settlement would have 
been called for in the first place if the various elements of Christian Europe had not 
persistently sought public supremacy, by violent means. (If you think Christian 
communities make no demanding public claims, consider Calvin’s totalitarian rule over 
Geneva: or the New England Puritan communities of Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter.) But 
one can certainly say that Christian doctrine contains some resources that make public 
neutrality possible -  “Render unto Caesar.. .” So, can a political settlement based on 
those resources be fairly imposed on other religious cultures?
It is important to raise this question because the liberal settlement, as described 
above, is defective; or else my account of it was defective; for while some rights, or all 
rights sometimes, may keep things off the political agenda, the political agenda may 
sometimes comprise nothing other than the contested interpretation of rights. Having a 
right may sometimes amount not to having absolute protection for an interest, but only to 
an entitlement to have one’s interest treated with due seriousness. That is because lists 
of rights are compelling only to the extent that they express intuitively compelling 
interests; and with few exceptions -  such as interests in not being subjected to purely 
random brutality of one kind or another -  interests carry intuitively compelling power 
only if abstractly stated; their abstractness enables them to cover ranges within which 
everyone will intuit compelling instances, and so can generalize from these to others 
within the range. And in the process of application, abstractly stated rights will need to 
be connected to concrete circumstances in ways that will obviously invite disagreement. 
Law textbooks teem with examples of the porous meaning even of specific rights claims. 
One has no right to bring a wheeled vehicle into a park: does that mean that a
municipality cannot bring a tank -  definable, rather, as a tracked vehicle -  into the park 
as a war memorial? One has no right to sleep in a railway station: does that mean one 
has no right to lie down in a railway station, awake but with one’s eyes closed, for long 
periods? And if the meaning of rights pertaining to relatively concrete terms such as 
“wheels” or “sleep” require interpretation, consider what burden of interpretation must 
rest on a right to, say, equality under the law.
The value of rights forces us back constantly to explore and assess the moral 
point that makes them compelling. That process is an especially important one in 
societies undergoing demographic change, as a result of which taken-for-granted 
interpretations of the point of rights may tend to be brought under stress, as different 
cultural backgrounds bring different sets of background expectations into play. 
Moreover, since the enforcement of rights is exactly the point at which state power 
meets personal behaviour, it is especially likely that challenges to prevailing political 
conceptions will take the form of challenges to the established meaning of rights. In fact, 
lacking majority power by definition, minorities may be able to mount challenges only 
by attacking that meaning -  in the courts or in the streets. So it is not only unjustifiable, 
it is unfaithful to the very point of rights to remove them from the table of public 
discussion in a society in which interpretative viewpoints are shifting in ways that 
continually bring their practical meaning into question. And if a conflict-resolving 
settlement has been reached on the basis of interpretative viewpoints that latecomers 
cannot share, it cannot rightfully claim the allegiance of latecomers without condemning 
them to (temporally-based) second-class citizenship.
That consideration would seem to shift the discussion from liberalism, 
understood as a regime of unassailable background rights, to democracy, understood as 
(in part) a regime in which rights become the subject of public agreement. But here it 
has to be said that some versions of democracy are no less unrealistic than a liberalism 
of literally unassailable rights would be -  if anyone actually supports a liberalism of that 
kind. In an idealized version of democratic deliberation, participants would recognize 
when a basic right was at stake and shape their contributions in light of reasonable 
requirements of that right.2 That requirement, however, while morally very sound, may 
overlook what we may term the asymmetrical character of (some) political 
disagreement; for participants may not agree that the issue is one of rights; or that, if it 
is, that the right in question is basic; or that only one right (basic or otherwise) is in play. 
They may, in short, frame the question before them in mutually incompatible ways -  
and then it is not clear that democracy can give us as legitimate an answer as it could 
when the participants all framed the question in the same way, so that the outcome could 
then be viewed as their considered answer to a common question. The democratic 
solution would just be a matter of counting heads. And if that is the way that public 
decisions are justified, why bother talking about rights in the first place? Just count 
heads and get on with it.
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I think there is a possible answer to the problem of asymmetry -  to the fact that 
participants may frame the issue before them in different ways. The answer concerns 
the issue of stakes. It is in principle possible -  though often politically difficult, of 
course -  to establish what kind of stake each party has in the solution to an issue, and to 
measure their stakes. So, for example, it would be wrong, on this view, for an 
electorate that happened to contain a male majority to rule on the question of abortion, in 
which women have an obviously greater stake; it would be wrong for a majority 
indifferent to matters of headgear to compel Sikhs to remove their turbans, since they 
have a religious stake in the importance of wearing them; it would be wrong for a more- 
or-less-religiously indifferent majority to impose a common pause day so inflexibly that 
it violated the Sabbatarian requirements of minorities. What one side has at stake has to 
be an issue if equality is not to be an entirely mechanical and unjustifiable value. The 
principle has to be modified, however, by another consideration. If majorities are to 
accept limits to the exercise of their power, they need to be given reasons; that some 
measure favoured by them would impede the important goals of minorities would 
amount to a reason against it; but the reason would weaken greatly if the minorities were 
able to pursue their essential goals in ways less offensive to majority objection. Whether 
or not they could substitute one sub-goal for another, then, while remaining committed 
to their main goal, would be an important consideration. So majorities could reasonably 
demand satisfaction on this point. An example: the UK government recently undertook 
to prohibit foxhunting, a sport that a majority of the UK electorate regards as cruel. 
Employing arguments (and tactics) that are more commonly associated with deprived 
alien minorities, the foxhunting crowd claimed that their traditional rural practices were 
being crushed underfoot by the cultural insensitivity of urban majorities, and that the 
traditional practice of foxhunting sustained important ends, such as local inter-class 
community, as well as contributing to the public good of pest control. Those are valid 
public arguments, but they are defeated if the same ends could be realized by means that j  
the majority found acceptable: by hunts employing dragging (i.e. the use of artificial 
scent) in the first case, and by other means of pest control in the second. Minorities, 
then, can’t hold majorities hostage by presenting non-negotiable demands, but must face 1 
the democratic possibility that their demands are open to amendment in light of i 
democratically presentable values. Minorities may legitimately claim stakes, but 
majorities may legitimately demand reasons.
Coming closer to the case at hand, the much-discussed “headscarf affair” in 
France makes the point about stakes very well. No version of Christianity requires its 
adherents to wear things to disclose their faith to others. It is not, then, much of a 
burden on Catholics to require a secular educational milieu that includes a prohibition on 
religious symbols. It only inhibits optional behaviour. It is, obviously, more of a burden 
on young Muslim women who because of their own beliefs (or because of legitimate 
deference to their parents’ beliefs) wish to cover their hair. They can, then, make a 
special claim based on this clear inequality. In reply, the state may rely on the French 
version of the liberal settlement: secular schooling marks the disengagement of public 
institutions that we accomplished in the 19th century. Or, the state may rely on some 
combination of this with a particularist historical claim: this is the French way, it’s how 
we do things. But of course, either reply is wide open to the objection that the “we” is
exclusive unless settlements can be renegotiated in light of demographic changes that 
cause them to become unfair. That argument was employed by British Muslim groups in 
the other notable case of the recent past, the protests triggered by Salman Rushdie’s 
novel, The Satanic Verses, protests that were in many ways a clear precursor to the 
Danish cartoon events. Uninhibited expression may be a British value, they objected, 
but the Britain that adopted it as a value was the Britain that existed before we came; and 
we need a say in determining what should be the values of the Britain that exists now 
that we are here.
I think, however, that this argument, while in principle good, is one that runs 
out too quickly to deal effectively with issues of expression; for the “stakes” argument 
has its limits. What lends it force is the sense that we have more of an interest in the 
conduct of our own lives than anyone else does -  a principle given its classical statement 
by J.S. Mill in On Liberty. Because of this, I can rightly complain when some 
requirement impedes my way of conducting my life even if it doesn’t impede everyone’s
-  it can become the basis of a special right. But exactly the same argument forbids the 
extension of our claims into the conduct of others’ lives, for they can use the very same 
principle (we have more of an interest in our lives than you do) to reject them. It is one 
thing to demand exemptions enabling one’s own conduct, something else to demand 
restrictions disabling others’.
Now expression, it is true, may not seem to fit quite easily into this distinction, 
for it is in one important way clearly different from simple cases of personal conduct. It 
has public consequences in that it creates a general climate in which everyone must live; 
and those who find the climate objectionable may claim, again rightly, that they are 
subjected to a burden that some others (those predisposed to indifference, for example) 
do not share. That claim gains political weight when accompanied by evidence of other 
burdens -  majority prejudice, for example, or higher-than-average rates of 
unemployment: the claim to be burdened by objectionable expression will then form part 
o f a larger complaint about exclusion and discrimination. And that larger complaint may 
very well be good. But the element that concerns expression weakens it, if we are at all 
concerned about good arguments. For a claim to control the public environment is not 
just a challenge to the liberal settlement: it is a challenge to any kind of political 
settlement at all. In a political society -  as opposed to a theocracy -  the public 
environment emerges (and changes) over time as the joint product of many 
contributions.3 It is not a monopoly product, and its essentially unplanned character 
poses risks. Anyone can contribute to it, but one’s contribution cannot consist of a claim 
to prevent others from contributing. That is exactly because the public environment 
affects everyone -  as we have seen, the very point from which the best case for limiting 
expression starts. Just because it affects everyone, to exclude contributions to it is to 
imply a claim to privilege.
This discussion, then, acknowledges a case for contextualism -  for modifying
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or renegotiating rights in light of historical particularity, or in light of the unfair 
distribution of burdens that equal rights sometimes impose; but it also argues that the 
case fails in the context of rights of expression. That is, in part, because expression is 
part of the very process of renegotiation that -  as burdened minorities rightly claim -  is 
essential if schemes of rights are to retain their legitimacy: burdened minorities could 
not make their case for renegotiation without it. But what of another important issue, 
that of self-censorship? After all, much of the objection to the Danish cartoons was cast 
in terms of the objectionable use of rights, not to their very existence -  and here we 
come back to another version of “I believe in free speech, but...” This version may rely 
on the perfectly sound distinction between having a right and being justified in 
exercising it: a right entitles you to do something, but doesn’t justify your doing it. 
People quite often use rights, after all, in order to do things that are wrong under their 
protection. So might we say: cartoonists have a right to offend, but shouldn’t? Of 
course we can say that, but saying it misses at least two important points. The first is 
that an essential part of having a right is having the discretion whether to use it or not, 
and unless we are willing to allow right-holders to exercise the discretion we ought to 
consider it wrong to extend rights to them in the first place. The second is that while we 
all, quite naturally, want individual right-holders to use their rights wisely and not to use 
them in order to do wrong, what opponents of offensiveness are effectively proposing is 
an informal control regime that, while stopping short of legal prohibition, inhibits the 
discretion of rights-holders by means of social pressure. That comes very close to 
hypocrisy. It would be more honest for those who propose this to say that freedom of 
expression is not really a basic value at all, but just one consideration that takes its 
chances along with many others, rather than paying it lip service while denying its 
consequences.
